Iraq Part Of America's Secret War

The Australian reports that in his new book "America's Secret War" George Friedman contends that although the US believed Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, the WMDs were ultimately "a cover for a much deeper game."

According to The Australian, after the Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan al-Qaeda pressed its grand design for an Islamist world federation, a new Caliphate, which would ultimately match, if not dominate, other superpowers. Global terrorism would be the means. Al-Qa'ida's opening moves - attacks on American embassies and other establishments abroad - were aimed, in Friedman's opinion, less at damaging the US than provoking it to a reckless assault on Islam:

This, al-Qa'ida believed, would stir the "Islamic street" to a confrontational mood with the West and rebellion against non-fundamentalist Islamic regimes, establishing the foundations of the great federation. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the US, confident of its hegemony, had concluded that "war was now optional", that no power existed that could force it into war.

The passive US response to its early pinprick attacks emboldened and frustrated al-Qa'ida. The jihadists, Friedman writes, "needed to strike a blow that would be devastating, [breaching] the threshold between what was tolerable and intolerable for the US". Their initiative was the September11, 2001, attack on New York and Washington, which shocked and disoriented the Americans. Their first reaction was to speculate almost in panic about a September 11 with nuclear weapons.

[. . .]

The invasion and speedy subjugation of Afghanistan staggered the jihadists. But the US, having succeeded only in dispersing al-Qa'ida and the Taliban, rather than eliminating them, believed it needed to strike another heavy blow.

By then it had identified the jihadist campaign as "a Saudi problem". Most of the September 11 suicide attackers had been Saudis. Bin Laden was a Saudi. Saudi money trails were everywhere. An invasion of Saudi Arabia presented the tactical problem of waging war against a country of vast area and the strategic one of disrupting the world's oil supplies.

The Americans had established and then strengthened a military presence in countries surrounding Saudi Arabia - Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. Invasion of Iraq would complete the encirclement.

"From a purely military view," Friedman adds, "Iraq is the most strategic single country in the Middle East, [bordering] six other countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and ."

So the US struck, with consequences unfolding nightly on our TV screens. Friedman believes the US-jihadist war hangs in the balance. However, the measured actions of the US during the past three years, including its strong military presence in the Middle East, have caused significant moderation of the position on global jihad of Saudi Arabia and other Muslim regimes.

The strategy of the jihadists has stalled: "Not a single regime has fallen to
al-Qa'ida ... There is no rising in the Islamic street. [There has been] complete failure of al-Qa'ida to generate the political response they were seeking ... At this point the US is winning ... The war goes on."

Last Sunday I watched CSPAN 2's "Book TV" broadcast about George Friedman's newest book, "America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between the United States and its Enemies."

Friedman's explanation of why we invaded Iraq is simply fascinating:

We went into Iraq to isolate and frighten the Saudi government into cracking down on the flow of money to Al Qaeda. Bush never answered the question for fear of the international consequences. Early in the war, the President said that the key was shutting down Al Qaeda's financing. Most of the financing came from Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi government was refusing to cooperate. After the invasion of Iraq, they completely changed their position. We did not invade Saudi Arabia directly because of fear that the fall of the Saudi government would disrupt oil supplies: a global disaster. [From this interview with George Friedman.]

His thoughts about and Pakistan are provocative:

“[The United States] will play defense against Al Qaeda in the United States and Saudi Arabia. It will threaten with war if aids Al Qaeda. Most importantly, the United States will have to invade northwestern Pakistan. There are plans for this already. In addition, if Pakistan collapses due to an invasion, the United States and India will have to jointly occupy Pakistan. The end game is Pakistan.”
-from this press release.]

Freidman's statements about reports that al-Qaeda had gotten hold of a nuclear weapon are terrifying. Finally the book's prognosis is encouraging:

The United States is winning the war. Al Qaeda has failed to achieve any of its strategic goals. There has been no uprising in the Islamic world, no regimes toppled. In fact, most Islamic governments have increased their cooperation with the United States. Al Qaeda has been backed against a wall. The game is far from over, but the U.S. certainly has the lead -- in spite of an extraordinary array of blunders, some inexplicable. [From Chapter Summaries - Conclusion.]

George Friedman is also the author of "The Intelligence Edge" and "The Future of War." Mr. Friedman previously worked as the director of the Center for Geopolitical Studies at Louisiana State University. He currently serves as chairman of Stratfor, an international private intelligence firm.

I agree with Professor Bainbridge that Freidman's book sounds like a stimulating must read.

UPDATE: Bill Hobbs is ahead of all us having already started reading Freidman's book. Bill says the book is excellent.

In October, Chuck's Daily Blog posted that Freidman said, America’s invasion of Iraq put pressure on the Saudis that forced them to act against al-Qaeda sympathizers within Saudi Arabia in ways the Saudis had been unwilling to do:

In the past year, Friedman argues, it has worked. The Saudis, shaken by America’s action, has engaged in a “civil war’’ against al-Qaeda, killing operatives, busting up cells and cracking down on the group’s financial network.

Ghost of a Flea posts it was obvious that the U.S. strategy in the war on terrorism was well thought out and hopes his confidence is not misplaced.

At Vox Baby, Andrew Samwick agrees that reform in Saudi Arabia is critical to peace in the Middle East, but posts that our next step should have been something to tip the balance in favor of democracy and nuclear disarmament in .

EagleSpeak also argues that the purpose of invading Iraq was to complete the encirclement of .

The Owner's Manual is also skeptical of Freidman's premise posting remaining steadfast in the task of cramming democracy down on people who increasingly resist it at the cost of a thousand of our finest countrymen is difficult enough without asserting that it is all about containing an erstwhile ally.

UPDATE II: At Power Line, deacon commenting on Freidman's book, posts that our greatest victories so far have been in convincing Pakistan to aid our effort in Afghanistan and then ousting the Taliban without causing an uprising against the Pakistani government and the crackdown against al-Qaeda, that organization's attacks against Saudi Arabia, the Saudis' response, and the lack of any resulting uprising against Saudi Arabia.

Comments

[Ghost of a flea]

Thanks for the link. I would like to add to the brief remark I made in my own post. The strategic elephant in the kitchen that nobody has talked about has always been "Saudi" Arabia. In this there is no little irony that Michael Moore, of all people, should be asking some of the right questions: why attack Iraq when the war on the West is financed, organized and ideologically instigated by the Saudis? The problem is that Moore and his followers answer the question with simple self-interest on the part of (some) elites by pointing the finger at the ruling families of the United States (though not France and Canada, etc. who have the same interests).

I believe Moore is incorrect in his answer. While self-interest may play a part the real answer - one that not even the ultra-left wants to believe - is that it was not within the power of the United States to invade and occupy "Saudi" Arabia. The Saudi military would not present an obstacle but the disruption to global oil supply could have triggered a global depression particularly in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001. Control of Iraq's oil reserves become pivotal to surviving any future threat to Saudi reserves.

One must also imagine the reaction to an actual occupation Mecca. This might have been enough to trigger the reaction the jihadists evidently wanted and have thus far failed to provoke. Bin Laden's first enemy is and always has been the Saudi royal family. Israel, the United States, India and the rest have always been a sideshow to his immediate target. What surprises me about this latest analysis is the continuing realization that so many people truly believe the United States to be omnipotent. It is not. In this respect I see the street protests as a psychological reaction to an imagined "bad father" who should have protected them on September 11. Continuing troubles in an imperfect world are, in this light, an immoral or irresponsible choice on the part of the bad father rather than an improvisation in the face of the bad hand dealt to us by the jihadists and the better part of a century of accommodation with the ruling family of Arabia.