NASA is now targeting March 2006 for the next Space Shuttle mission, STS-121. NASA is now referring to the "test flight to the International Space Station in the Shuttle Return to Flight series."
The NASA announcement stated a pair of "Tiger Teams" continues to investigate the External Tank foam loss during Discovery's launch on July 26. It was also announced that Discovery will be used for STS-121 instead of Atlantis. Atlantis will fly the following mission, STS-115, carrying Space Station truss segments which are too heavy to be carried by Discovery.
The Announcement of no flight until March came after a "minority report" said NASA had not learned key lessons that had emerged from the Columbia disaster. The BBC reported that seven members of an oversight panel said NASA had not learned key lessons that had emerged from the Columbia disaster:
Their "minority report" was contained within the final report by the 26-member Return to Flight task group appointed to evaluate how the US space agency meets the recommendations by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (Caib).
So much emphasis was placed on trying to meet unrealistic launch dates that some safety improvements were skipped, said the group.
"We expected that Nasa leadership would set high standards for post-Columbia work...we were, overall, disappointed," the panellists wrote in the report.
The seven critics included a former shuttle astronaut, former undersecretary of the Navy, a former congressional budget office director, former moon rocket engineer, a retired nuclear engineer and two university professors.
NASA should have fixed the foam debris problem long ago, but certainly after the loss of Columbia.
UPDATE: The Final Report of the Return to Flight Task Group can be accessed, in whole or in part, here. The "minority report" can be found at Annex A.2, pages 188- 216. The minority report is scathing:
Summary
It is difficult to be objective based on hindsight, but it appears to us that lessons that should have been learned have not been. Perhaps we expected or hoped for too much. The CAIB report should have served NASA as a “wake-up” call. As the CAIB noted (Vol. I, p. 208), “The recognition of human spaceflight as a developmental activity requires a shift in focus from operations and meeting schedules to a concern for the risks involved. Necessary measures include … Barring unwarranted departures from design standards, and adjusting standards only under the most rigorous, safety-driven process.”
We expected that NASA leadership would set high standards for post-Columbia work. We expected upfront standards of validation, verification and certification. We expected rigorous and integrated risk management processes. We expected involved and insightful leadership from NASA Headquarters. We were, overall, disappointed.
[. . .]
Conclusion
Among the most damning observations CAIB made of NASA was the sense of complacency toward the problem of the External Tank shedding of foam. Despite program requirements that no debris should be shed, there were over 15,000 instances of damage to the Orbiter, most of which came from debris from the Space Shuttle elements. As has been widely reported, two flights before Columbia, a large piece of foam was shed and caused minor damage to one of the Solid Rocket Boosters. Photographic documentation was available of major foam shedding from the External Tanks on at least seven previous flights (CAIB Vol. I, p. 85). Despite all this evidence, foam had never destroyed an Orbiter and the program relied on this. “flight history” to justify inactivity before and during the flight of Columbia.
This “We’ve seen this before” mentality is still present, and it appeared on more than one occasion during MMT simulations. In addition, leading up to the return-to-flight, the program justified not pursuing potential ice damage to the Orbiter umbilical doors because there had not been substantial damage on previous flights. Despite the evidence of impacts all around the area, the official rationale for accepting the risk was listed as “flight history;” i.e., we’ve never had critical damage there before.
NASA’s leaders and managers must break this cycle of smugness substituting for knowledge. NASA must be able to quantify risk, even if imperfectly, set requirements and expectations, and hold organizations and individuals accountable, Analytical models – while valuable tools – cannot substitute for engineering judgment and conscience. Rigor must be reestablished throughout the Agency. Opinion, no matter how well informed, cannot replace objective evidence. Flight history, while critical for informed judgment, cannot substitute for it. “We’ve been lucky” is a statement that should never be associated with the human spaceflight programs.
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