Sadr Ascending

The New York Times reports on Moktada al-Sadr, and his so-called militias' ascendency as Iraq's parliamentary elections near. It's a depressing tale much like that of a bully who everyone is afraid to confront.

According to the Times, using violence and popularity as the complementary tools of his authority, Sadr is becoming one of Iraq's most powerful figures:

Just a year after Mr. Sadr led two fierce uprisings, the Americans are hailing his entry into the elections as the best sign yet that the political process can co-opt insurgents.

But Mr. Sadr's ascent could portend a much darker chain of events, for he continues to embrace his image as an unrepentant guerrilla leader even as he takes the reins of political power.

Mr. Sadr has made no move to disband his militia, the thousands-strong Mahdi Army. In recent weeks, factions of the militia have brazenly assaulted and abducted Sunni Arabs, rival Shiite groups, journalists and British-led forces in the south, where Mr. Sadr has a zealous following. At least 19 foreign soldiers and security contractors have been killed there since late summer, mostly by roadside bombs planted by Shiite militiamen who use ian technology, British officers say. The latest killing took place Nov. 20 in Basra.

Mr. Sadr used his "political capital" to get 30 of his candidates on the Shiite coalition's slate, as many as the number allotted to each of the two main governing parties, the Dawa Islamic Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. He also negotiated with for executive offices and ministry posts in Iraq's next government.

The U.S. army considered arresting Sadr late last in 2003. Sadr wasn't arrested to avoid inflaming Iraq's Shiite majority. At the time Sadr was wanted for alleged participation in the April 2003 murder of cleric, Abdel Majid al-Khoi. In April 2004 Sadr's followers launched a violent campaign against US-led coalition forces in Iraq. This violence resulted in American forces killing hundreds of insurgents in and around Baghdad in fighting that lasted a week.

The next month Iraqi Shi'ite political leaders tried to contain Sadr by insisting the holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala be disarmed. This led to more fighting between U.S. forces and Sadr's forces.

Unfortunately coalition forces never forced closure with Sadr.

There is only one way to deal with a thug such as Sadr, remove him and render him powerless. That requires disarming his band of guerrillas. That could have been done by arresting him in 2003. Failing to force closure with Sadr and his thugs made the coalition appear weak. We managed to inflame the opposition and alienate the center. American military and Iraqi civilians are still paying the price for our earlier timidity.

Comments

[Matthew Shugart]

Arresting him would have generated an uprising.

That's the "democracy" we have built in Iraq: The Shiite majority has been empowered, and its leadership obviously considers Sadr critical to maintainings its grip on the levers of power. That's why they negotiated his inclusion into their alliance list.