CALIFORNIA YANKEE

Soviet uranium removed from Bulgaria

The last of the Soviet highly enriched uranium was removed from Bulgaria Thursday and transported to a secured site in Russia:

The removal of the uranium, stored in Bulgaria since the 1970s, is part of an initiative to deter nuclear proliferation by terrorist groups and other militants whose stated goals include detonating a dirty bomb constructed with nuclear material.

"The complete removal of all highly enriched uranium from Bulgaria is another milestone in NNSA's cooperative effort to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation and prevent nuclear terrorism," Thomas D'Agostino, NNSA administrator, said in a statement.

Bulgaria is the second country to return all Soviet-origin highly enriched uranium to secure sites. Through National Nuclear Security Administration’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative. the United States worked in close cooperation with the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency to pack, secure and ship the material.

North Korea Helped Syria's Nuclear Program

At the Wall Street Journal, Jay Solomon reports North Korea was helping Syria build a plutonium-based nuclear reactor.

Speculation about North Korea's alleged role was sparked by a September Israeli strike inside Syria, which targeted what many U.S. government and private analysts believe was a nascent nuclear reactor.

[. . .]

This week, the Central Intelligence Agency is expected to begin briefing members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees on the Israeli strike, according to Congressional and administration officials, based in part on intelligence provided by the Israeli government.

The information is expected to confirm that North Korea was helping Syria develop a plutonium-based nuclear reactor similar to the Yongbyon facility North Korea built north of Pyongyang, said an official familiar with the deliberations. The briefings are also expected to confirm that North Korean workers were active at the Syrian site at the time of the Israeli attack.

Less conclusive, however, is any firm evidence that Syria was attempting to develop nuclear weapons, according to the U.S. official.

This would seem to confirm what I posted last September -- about Israel attacking Syrian nuclear material and the North Korean involvement.

This also justifies my long held skepticism about North Korea's so-called agreement to give up its nukes.

Saudis Preparing For Nuclear Fallout

Venomous Kate has an interesting post about the Saudis preparations for "sudden nuclear and radioactive hazards."

Kate also notes some interesting and familiar sounding military positioning plus sanctions:

• Last week, a U.S. nuclear sub joined the fleet stationed in the Persian Gulf.

• On land, Russian sources say the U.S. is currently massing forces on the ian border.

• Today the U.S. announced plans to sanction ’s Central Bank for funding state-sponsored terrorism.

Read the whole thing.

Like Cheney, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell has tried to undo some of the political and diplomatic damage done by the NIE:

During his February 5, 2008 testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell tried to undo some of the political and diplomatic damage done by the NIE:

Not only did McConnell testify that the Islamic Republic was working to master the enrichment of uranium--"the most difficult challenge in nuclear production"--but he also acknowledged that, "because of intelligence gaps," the U.S. government could not be certain that the ian government had fully suspended its covert nuclear programs. "We assess with high confidence that has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons," he testified. "In our judgment, only an ian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep from eventually producing nuclear weapons--and such a decision is inherently reversible."

McConnell, appearing on the February 17, 2008 edition of "Fox News Sunday," Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell said could have a nuclear weapon next year:

WALLACE: Finally, you have dialed back on the recent national intelligence estimate that reported that gave up its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

In fact, you said you wish you had the opportunity to redo the public presentation. Do you feel that the NIE understated the threat from ?

MCCONNELL: No. Chris, if the words in the NIE were correct, what I think we probably didn't do an adequate job on is reflecting — there are three parts to a nuclear program.

You have to have fissile material. You have to have a means to deliver a weapon. And you have to have the technical — to design a weapon.

The only thing that they terminated in 2003 was the design feature of the weapon. They're still pursuing fissile material. They're still pursuing missiles for delivery.

As it turns out, though, the hardest part is fissile material. The easiest part is weapons design. So when I testified on the Hill recently, the attempt was to put it in context.

WALLACE: So are you saying that and its uranium enrichment program and what that could lead to is as much of a threat as it ever was?

MCCONNELL: I am saying that. And I believe that the path they were on to achieve nuclear weapons has not been significantly changed because they terminated this technical design feature.

They can turn it on. Remember, it was secret. They've never admitted it. They could have turned it back on now and we wouldn't necessarily know. We'll try to know, but we're not 100 percent sure of that.

WALLACE: And the time frame for them to get the ability to make a nuclear bomb?

MCCONNELL: We've done an estimate in 2001, 2005 and 2007, and each time it says the same thing. They could do it by 2009 — unlikely. The range is 2010 to 2015. And the best guess is about the middle range there for having a nuclear weapon.

Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert believes that could have "a nuclear weapons capacity" in a few months.

UN Sanctions Again

The United Nations Security Council adopted a third resolution imposing sanctions on for its refusal to cease enriching uranium designed to build nuclear weapons.

The new sanctions add to Council sanctions imposed in 2006 and 2007.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 14 - 0, with Indonesia abstaining, and calls on "Member States" to inspect cargoes to and from believed to contain goods prohibited by U.N. resolutions, mandates tighter monitoring of financial institutions and imposes additional travel bans and asset freezes.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zamay Khalizad puts 's continued nuclear defiance in perspective:

Instead of suspending its proliferation-sensitive activities as the council has required, is dramatically expanding the number of operating centrifuges and developing a new generation of centrifuges, testing one of them with nuclear fuel.

[. . .]

The latest report from the IAEA [the International Atomic Energy Agency] states that has not met its obligation to fully disclose its past nuclear-weapons program. On the core issue of whether 's nuclear program is strictly peaceful, the report showed no serious progress.

The IAEA presented with documents assembled over a period of years from multiple member states and the agency's own investigations. The documents detailed 's efforts to develop a nuclear warhead, including designs for a missile re-entry vehicle, and showed other possible undeclared activities with nuclear material.

dismissed these documents as "baseless and fabricated." But the IAEA does not share that conclusion.

Instead of slogans and obfuscations, the international community needs answers from . The international community must be able to believe 's declaration that its nuclear program is for exclusively peaceful purposes. ian leaders must as a first step fully disclose past weapons-related work, and implement additional safeguards to ensure no continuing hidden activities. We agree with the IAEA that until takes these steps, 's nuclear program cannot be verified as peaceful.

The latest IAEA report also states that is not suspending its proliferation-sensitive activities.

For almost two years now, the Security Council has required to suspend all of its enrichment-related, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities. I want to ask the ian leaders, "If your goal is to generate nuclear power for peaceful purposes, why do you court increasing international isolation, economic pressure and more, all for a purported goal more easily and inexpensively obtained with the diplomatic solution we and others offer?"

I want the ian people and others around the world to know that the United States recognizes 's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They should know that the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany have offered to help develop civil nuclear power, if it complies with the Security Council's demand -- a very reasonable demand -- to suspend enrichment. They should know that the package of incentives includes active international support to build state-of-the art light water power reactors, and reliable access to nuclear fuel.

should do what other nations have done to eliminate any doubts that their nuclear program is peaceful. Many states have made the decision to abandon programs to produce a nuclear weapon. Two of them sit on the Security Council today: South Africa and Libya.

Other countries that have stepped away from past nuclear-weapon aspirations include Brazil, Argentina, Romania, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. These countries did not see their security diminished as a result of their decisions. Indeed, one could easily say their security has been enhanced. Nor did they lose their right to develop nuclear energy. We urge to take the same path these other states have chosen.

The international community has good reason to be concerned about 's activities to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability. The present ian regime, armed with nuclear weapons, would pose a greater potential danger to the region and to the world.

The ian government has been a destabilizing force in the broader Middle East and beyond. Contrary to its statements, has been funding and supporting terrorists and militants for operations in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Iraq and Afghanistan. Their lethal assistance has harmed countless innocent civilians. The president of has made many reprehensible statements -- embracing the objective of destroying a member state of the United Nations.

Because of all these factors, the international community cannot allow to develop nuclear weapons. If continues down its current path, it would likely fuel proliferation activities in the region, which, in turn, could cause the demise of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime itself.

The U.S. remains committed to a diplomatic solution. If shares this commitment, it will suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities and let diplomacy succeed.

The documents Ambassador Khalizad referred to discredit the December 2007 National Intelligence Unintelligence Estimate (NIE), which Ahmadinejad called a "declaration of victory."

During his February 5, 2008 testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell tried to undo some of the political and diplomatic damage done by the NIE:

Not only did McConnell testify that the Islamic Republic was working to master the enrichment of uranium--"the most difficult challenge in nuclear production"--but he also acknowledged that, "because of intelligence gaps," the U.S. government could not be certain that the ian government had fully suspended its covert nuclear programs. "We assess with high confidence that has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons," he testified. "In our judgment, only an ian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep from eventually producing nuclear weapons--and such a decision is inherently reversible."

McConnell, appearing on the February 17, 2008 edition of "Fox News Sunday," Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell said could have a nuclear weapon next year:

WALLACE: Finally, you have dialed back on the recent national intelligence estimate that reported that gave up its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

In fact, you said you wish you had the opportunity to redo the public presentation. Do you feel that the NIE understated the threat from ?

MCCONNELL: No. Chris, if the words in the NIE were correct, what I think we probably didn't do an adequate job on is reflecting — there are three parts to a nuclear program.

You have to have fissile material. You have to have a means to deliver a weapon. And you have to have the technical — to design a weapon.

The only thing that they terminated in 2003 was the design feature of the weapon. They're still pursuing fissile material. They're still pursuing missiles for delivery.

As it turns out, though, the hardest part is fissile material. The easiest part is weapons design. So when I testified on the Hill recently, the attempt was to put it in context.

WALLACE: So are you saying that and its uranium enrichment program and what that could lead to is as much of a threat as it ever was?

MCCONNELL: I am saying that. And I believe that the path they were on to achieve nuclear weapons has not been significantly changed because they terminated this technical design feature.

They can turn it on. Remember, it was secret. They've never admitted it. They could have turned it back on now and we wouldn't necessarily know. We'll try to know, but we're not 100 percent sure of that.

WALLACE: And the time frame for them to get the ability to make a nuclear bomb?

MCCONNELL: We've done an estimate in 2001, 2005 and 2007, and each time it says the same thing. They could do it by 2009 — unlikely. The range is 2010 to 2015. And the best guess is about the middle range there for having a nuclear weapon.

Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert believes that could have "a nuclear weapons capacity" in a few months.

Continuing to dither on, Britain, France and Germany were said to preparing a draft resolution critical of that could be adopted by the IAEA's policy-making body later this week. According to the New York Times, the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan already have indicated privately they would support such a move, but Russia and China have already scuttled those plans.

The European powers continue to try the failed carrot and stick approach to eliminate any doubts that 's nuclear program is peaceful. They continue despite 's frequent insistence that its nuclear ambitions will not be deterred and even in the face of 's boasting that it "duped" the European powers while playing for time to work on its secret nuclear program.

It's time for a different approach.

Strengthened By NIE

Meir Javedanfar writes that hope of a strong united international front against is gone, after the NIE gave state sponsor of terrorism a clean bill of health regarding nuclear weapons:

It is one thing when the IAEA gives positive points for being “generally truthful about its past.” After all, many argue that the IAEA is a toothless bureaucratic organization, at the mercy of different governments and their political agendas.

But when the multi-billion dollar US intelligence machine declares halted its nuclear weapons program back in 2003, then as far as many Middle Eastern countries are concerned, the “danger” label has been taken off ’s nuclear program.

Although many Sunni countries are worried about Tehran’s activities in Iraq and Lebanon, they were more worried about the prospects of war between Washington and Tehran. Now that this danger has dissipated, it is likely that even more countries in the region will decide to engage , as means of influencing its strategy and behavior in the Middle East. This will make the job of imposing sanctions against much more difficult than before.

It will also enable to come out of regional isolation, thus ruining all the celebration that took place in Washington and Jerusalem following the Annapolis show of solidarity.

In just one document, in which incendiary conclusions are misrepresented and not supported by the substance of the report and which some suggest was artfully written to damage President Bush, the writers have managed to undo years and years of effort to contain the world's leading state sponsor of terror and its nuclear ambitions.

This will only embolden . A more confident and less vilified is more likely to continue to engage in activities which will make war more likely.

Related:
Changing Our View Of
Spying and Policymaking Don't Mix

Spying and Policymaking Don't Mix

Henry A. Kissinger has an important article in the Washington Post about misreading the report and the recent tendency of the intelligence community to turn itself into a kind of check on the executive branch:

The "Key Judgments" released by the intelligence community last week begin with a dramatic assertion: "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." This sentence was widely interpreted as a challenge to the Bush administration policy of mobilizing international pressure against alleged ian nuclear programs. It was, in fact, qualified by a footnote whose complex phraseology obfuscated that the suspension really applied to only one aspect of the ian nuclear weapons program (and not even the most significant one): the construction of warheads. That qualification was not restated in the rest of the document, which continued to refer to the "halt of the weapons program" repeatedly and without qualification.

The reality is that the concern about ian nuclear weapons has had three components: the production of fissile material, the development of missiles and the building of warheads. Heretofore, production of fissile material has been treated as by far the greatest danger, and the pace of ian production of fissile material has accelerated since 2006. So has the development of missiles of increasing range. What appears to have been suspended is the engineering aimed at the production of warheads.

The NIE holds that may be able to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by the end of 2009 and, with increasing confidence, more warheads by the period 2010 to 2015. That is virtually the same timeline as was suggested in the 2005 National Intelligence Estimate.

[. . .]

It is therefore doubtful that the evidence supports the dramatic language of the summary and, even less so, the broad conclusions drawn in much of the public commentary.

[. . .]

I have often defended the dedicated members of the intelligence community. This is why I am extremely concerned about the tendency of the intelligence community to turn itself into a kind of check on, instead of a part of, the executive branch. When intelligence personnel expect their work to become the subject of public debate, they are tempted into the roles of surrogate policymakers and advocates. Thus the deputy director for intelligence estimates explained the release of the NIE as follows: Publication was chosen because the estimate conflicted with public statements by top U.S. officials about , and "we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available." That may explain releasing the facts but not the sources and methods that have been flooding the media. The paradoxical result of the trend toward public advocacy is to draw intelligence personnel more deeply than ever into the public maelstrom.

Read the whole thing. Consider it required reading.

Related: Changing Our View Of

Changing Our View Of

Richard Fernandez writes a grown up post about the NIE and ian Intentions:

Those worried the recent NIE is wrong in estimating that is no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons program have grounds to worry. Intelligence assessments are often wrong. That may not accord with the glamorous movie portrayals of spies and espionage, but that's how it is.

A list of historical intelligence failures makes depressing reading.

[. . .]

Whether we like it or not, there are limits to what intelligence can know at any one time. The inescapable uncertainties may make it impossible to decide the status of ’s nuclear program "once and for all". As in the case of the Soviet Union changes in the situation and leadership happen all the time. Honest analysts must keep revising the picture as new information comes to light. While Washington politics describes any change in intelligence estimates as examples of ‘lying’ or incompetence the plain fact is that altering assessments is endemic to the process. An unchanging intelligence picture is a wrong picture. Changing your mind is a natural thing to do.

What’s needed is a way to keep improving the picture with each successive measurement. Bruce Blair, a former Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, notes that as long as “changing one’s mind” is done scientifically using a mathematical tool called Bayes’ analysis, the result is a more accurate intelligence estimate.

Bayes' analysis is often called the science of changing one’s mind. The mental process begins with an initial estimate – a preexisting belief – of the probability that, say, an adversary possesses weapons of mass destruction, or that an attack by those weapons is underway. This initial subjective expectation is then exposed to confirming or contradictory intelligence or warning reports, and is revised using Bayes' formula. Positive findings strengthen the decisionmaker's belief that weapons of mass destruction exist or that an attack is underway; negative findings obviously weaken it. … it is quite possible for the intelligence findings to be wildly off the mark for 10 or more cycles of assessment before settling down and converging on the truth.

[. . .]

The key to achieving a "convergence" between fact and perception is repeated measurement. In plain words intelligence agencies must repeatedly measure and re-measure until they are convinced what they are seeing is "true".

Read the whole thing.

Fernandez's analysis is all the more important considering the fact that Israeli and British intelligence disagree with the new NIE.

Israeli Commandos Snatch Korean Nuclear Material

The Times of London reports that prior to the Israeli air raid on Syria's secret military compound near Dayr az-Zawr, Israeli commandos seized samples of nuclear material and laboratory analysis confirmed that the material was North Korean in origin.

ISRAELI commandos from the elite Sayeret Matkal unit – almost certainly dressed in Syrian uniforms – made their way stealthily towards a secret military compound near Dayr az-Zawr in northern Syria. They were looking for proof that Syria and North Korea were collaborating on a nuclear programme.

Israel had been surveying the site for months, according to Washington and Israeli sources. President George W Bush was told during the summer that Israeli intelligence suggested North Korean personnel and nuclear-related material were at the Syrian site.

Israel was determined not to take any chances with its neighbour. Following the example set by its raid on an Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak 1981, it drew up plans to bomb the Syrian compound.

But Washington was not satisfied. It demanded clear evidence of nuclear-related activities before giving the operation its blessing. The task of the commandos was to provide it.

Today the site near Dayr az-Zawr lies in ruins after it was pounded by Israeli F15Is on September 6. Before the Israelis issued the order to strike, the commandos had secretly seized samples of nuclear material and taken them back into Israel for examination by scientists, the sources say. A laboratory confirmed that the unspecified material was North Korean in origin. America approved an attack.

A note of caution here. One of the reporters, Uzi Mahnaimi, once reported that Israel was working on a bioweapon that would affect Arab genes only.

According to the Times, Israel's attack on the “North Korean project” is part of a secret war against the weapons of mass destruction ambitions of the “axis of evil” - - Syria, North Korea and .

A number of North Koreans are believed to have been killed in the air raid:

Diplomats in North Korea and China said they believed a number of North Koreans were killed in the raid, noting that ballistic missile technicians and military scientists had been working for some time with the Syrians.

[. . .]

The growing assumption that North Korea suffered direct casualties in the raid appears to be based largely on the regime’s unusually strident propaganda on an issue far from home. But there were also indications of conversations between Chinese and North Korean officials and intelligence reports reaching Asian governments that supported the same conclusion, diplomats said.

Last week, Jane's Defence Weekly, reported dozens of ian engineers and 15 Syrian officers were killed in a July 23 explosion in Syria. According Jane's, a joint Syrian-ian team was attempting to mount a chemical warhead on a Scud missile when the explosion occurred, spreading lethal chemical agents, including sarin nerve gas.

Syria's promise to to retaliate for the September 6 air raid is being taken seriously. Israel has made it clear that it will retaliate if it is attacked with weapons of mass destruction. Israel scrambled fighter jets toward Syria twice in the last few days. While Israelis were observing Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, police foiled a terrorist attack in Tel Aviv.

The New York Times reports that John Bolton suggests that the Israeli strike vindicates his view that Syria is actively pursuing a nuclear program, which was at the center of the 2005 fight over his nomination of to become ambassador to the United Nations.

The Israeli strike against Syria is a reminder that the "New Axis of Evil" remains a serious and determined group of state sponsors of terror. A fact which eludes the Democrats' Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi.

More at Blue Crab Boulevard, Hot Air and Patterico's Pontifications.

Israel Attacks Nuclear Material In Syria

Remember those reports 10 days ago that Israeli aircraft had overflown Syria and were forced to drop fuel tanks and skedaddle when Syrian air defenses engaged the Israelis?

Last week American officials confirmed that Israeli warplanes had attacked inside Syria:

A Defense Department official said Israeli jets had struck at least one target in northeastern Syria last Thursday, but the official said it was still unclear exactly what the jets hit and the extent of the bombing damage.

[. . .]

Officials in Washington said that the most likely targets of the raid were weapons caches that Israel’s government believes has been sending the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah through Syria. and Syria are Hezbollah’s primary benefactors, and American intelligence officials say a steady flow of munitions from runs through Syria and into Lebanon.

According to the New York Times, Israeli officials believe that North Korea is selling some of its nuclear material to and Syria.

Today the Sunday Times reports that the Israeli air strike destroyed a cache of nuclear materials:

IT was just after midnight when the 69th Squadron of Israeli F15Is crossed the Syrian coast-line. On the ground, Syria’s formidable air defences went dead. An audacious raid on a Syrian target 50 miles from the Iraqi border was under way.

At a rendezvous point on the ground, a Shaldag air force commando team was waiting to direct their laser beams at the target for the approaching jets. The team had arrived a day earlier, taking up position near a large underground depot. Soon the bunkers were in flames.

Ten days after the jets reached home, their mission was the focus of intense speculation this weekend amid claims that Israel believed it had destroyed a cache of nuclear materials from North Korea.

The Times reports preparations for the attack began in late spring, when the Mossad, learned that Syria was seeking to buy a nuclear device from North Korea. Israel feared such a device could eventually be installed on North-Korean-made Scud-C missiles:

We’ve known for a long time that Syria has deadly chemical warheads on its Scuds, but Israel can’t live with a nuclear warhead.

Syria has purchased between 60 and 120 Scud-C missiles from North Korea.

The Israeli air strike again puts the world on notice that Israel will not dither indefinitely while the rest of the world watches diplomacy fail to solve the problem of terrorist states, such as and Syria pursue nuclear programs. The attack also demonstrates that the vaunted air defense systems Russia sold to Syria and aren't as effective as advertised.

Is anyone else wondering if the Israeli attack was against Iraq's missing weapons of mass destruction?

UPDATE: Newsweek suggests that Israel's Syrian raid is warning for 's nuclear program:

"It's a tacit reminder to Europe and to Washington that if they don't take a tougher action against , Israel may have to do it alone," says Avner Cohen, a nuclear expert and a senior fellow at the United States Institute for Peace.

[. . .]

For Israel, the possibility of a nuclear-armed adversary might have been enough to warrant the operation. Officially in a state of war with Syria—and —Israel has vowed to let neither country obtain nukes (though Israel itself is believed to have built at least 200 nuclear bombs in its secret Dimona plant).

The Guardian goes further calling the Syrian raid a dry run for an attack against 's nuclear facilities:

Two detachable tanks from an Israeli fighter were found just over the Turkish border. According to Turkish military sources, they belonged to a Raam F15I - the newest generation of Israeli long-range bomber, which has a combat range of over 2,000km when equipped with the drop tanks. This would enable them to reach targets in , leading to speculation that it was an 'operation rehearsal' for a raid on Tehran's nuclear facilities.

[. . .]

So Operation Orchard can be seen as a dry run, a raid using the same heavily modified long-range aircraft, procured specifically from the US with 's nuclear sites in mind. It reminds both and Syria of the supremacy of its aircraft and appears to be designed to deter Syria from getting involved in the event of a raid on - a reminder, if it were required, that if Israel's ground forces were humiliated in the second Lebanese war its airforce remains potent, powerful and unchallenged.

At Captain's Quarters, Ed Morrissey writes that Syrian nukes would result in an immediate war with Israel which could involve the U.S.

More at Anti-Idiotarian Rottweiller Atlas Shrugged, Blue Crab Boulevard, and Strata-Sphere,

Israel Stands Alone

Daniel Pipes writes that President Bush has decided not to attack , which leaves only Israel to disrupt 's nuclear program.

Pipes considers the analysis of Whitney Raas and Austin Long "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy ian Nuclear Facilities." Raas and Long consider five components of a successful strike:

• Intelligence: To impede the production of fissile material requires incapacitating only three facilities of 's nuclear infrastructure. In ascending order of importance, these are the heavy water plant and plutonium production reactors under construction at Arak, a uranium conversion facility in Isfahan, and a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Destroying the Natanz facility, in particular, they note, "is critical to impeding 's progress toward nuclearization."

• Ordnance: To damage all three facilities with reasonable confidence requires — given their size, their being underground, the weapons available to the Israeli forces, and other factors — twenty-four 5,000-lb. weapons and twenty-four 2,000-lb. weapons.

• Platforms: Noting the "odd amalgamation of technologies" available to the ians and the limitations of their fighter planes and ground defenses to stand up to the high-tech Israeli air force, Ms. Raas and Mr. Long calculate that the IDF needs a relatively small strike package of 25 F–15Is and 25 F–16Is.

• Routes: Israeli jets can reach their targets via three paths: Turkey to the north, Jordan and Iraq in the middle, or Saudi Arabia to the south. In terms of fuel and cargo, the distances in all three cases are manageable.

• Defense forces: Rather than predict the outcome of an Israeli-ian confrontation, the authors calculate how many Israeli planes would have to reach their three targets for the operation to succeed. They figure 24 planes must reach Natanz, six to Isfahan, and five to Arak, or 35 altogether. Turned around, that means the ian defenders minimally must stop 16 of 50 planes, or one-third of the strike force. The authors consider this attrition rate "considerable" for Natanz and "almost unimaginable" for the other two targets.

Osirak Redux is available here in PDF format.

Raas and Long conclude that the Israeli Air Force possesses the technical capability to carry out an attack to destroy even well-hardened targets in with some degree of confidence. That leaves the question as to whether Israel, unlike the U.S., has the political will to do it.